In this paper the relationship between profit sharing, employee effort and wage formation is analysed under different relative timings for the determination of base wage and profit sharing. We show that the optimal profit share, decided by firms, under commitment exceeds that under flexibility. This holds true, because by committing itself to a profit share the firm can induce wage moderation, which adds to the returns from using the profit sharing instrument. If the profit share is negotiated it depends positively on the relative bargaining power of trade unions and it has both effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects.
I.

Introduction
Profit sharing refers to performance-related remuneration mechanisms consisting of a base wage plus a share of profits of firms. It is an empirically important phenomenon in many OECD countries. The OECD Employment Outlook (1995) reports cross-country evidence on profit sharing in OECD countries. Pendleton et. al (2001) present more recent and detailed data on the large proportion of workplaces with financial employee participation, in particular in the form of profit sharing schemes, in EU-countries. For further detailed evidence regarding profit sharing we refer to DICE database collected by CESifo, http://www.CESifo.de. As profit sharing schemes are nowadays commonly used, it is important to study their implications. Weitzman (1985 Weitzman ( , 1987 conjectured that profit sharing systems would both dampen the business cycle fluctuations of employment and reduce equilibrium unemployment. Holmlund (1991) formally explored the relationship between profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment. He argued that profit sharing will reduce (increase) equilibrium unemployment if and only if the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital exceeds (falls short of) one, while it will have no effect on equilibrium unemployment when the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is equal to one. Layard and Nickell (1990) show a similar neutrality result in the case of a CobbDouglas production function and efficient bargaining. In all these contributions the profit sharing instrument is negotiated and assumed to have no incentive effect on the workers' effort decisions. But this does not lie in conformity with empirical evidence according to which profit sharing enhances effort provision and thereby productivity (see e.g. Wadhwani and Wall (1990) , Cahuc and Dormont (1997) and Booth and Frank (1999) ).
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In this paper we first incorporate the productivity effect of profit sharing into our model in an environment with firms facing revenue uncertainty by focusing on a production technology with unit elasticity of substitution between employment and effort.
This combines and unifies elements from union bargaining and efficiency wage theories so that we can explore the implications of profit sharing in a more realistic way, which lies in conformity with empirics. Second, we analyse the following unexplored issue.
How does the time sequence between base wage formation and profit sharing impact on both the negotiated wage and the optimal profit share and its determinants? Section II presents the basic structure of the model and various time sequences for t h e p r o f i t s h a r i n g d e c i s i o n . T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f e f f o r t b y e m p l o y e e s a n d t h e employment decision by firms are presented in section III, while section IV investigates the determination of the compensation scheme under flexibility versus commitment in terms of the profit sharing decision as well as the case where the profit share and the base wage are negotiated simultaneously. Finally, we present a brief conclusion.
II. Basic Framework
We consider a representative firm operating in an environment with revenue uncertainty. In conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis we assume that the output depends not only on the number of workers employed, but also on the effort supplied by each worker, i.e. productivity. By employing L units of labour, each providing effort, a , the revenues accruing to the firm are given by 
The profit share, τ , determines what fraction of the firm' s profits is transferred to e m p l o y e d w o r k e r s a s p a r t o f t h e c o n t r a c t . T h e f i r m u n i l a t e r a l l y d e t e r m i n e s t h e employment level and the employee the effort level once wages and profit sharing have been determined. As the trade union is formed by homogenous agents and as intraorganizational agency issues within the union are outside the scope of our analysis, the union is assumed to be able to enforce the effort provision by the representative union 3 member so as to eliminate the potential free rider problems. 2 We summarise the various alternative timing of decisions made by the firm, the union and the union members in Figure 1 .
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Stage 4 
III. Labour Demand and Effort
The risk-neutral firm decides on employment L so as to maximize the expected
Conditional on the negotiated base wage and profit share the risk-neutral representative employed union member makes the effort decision in order to maximize the expected utility ( )
function of effort. The optimal employment and effort provision is determined by the system of first-order conditions
According to (4) the firm chooses the employment level so as to equalize the expected marginal return from labour to the wage cost, while (5) characterizes the determination of effort by a representative employee so as to equalize the expected marginal benefit from effort to the marginal disutility of effort.
In order to m ake th e com paris on of resul ts wi th the earl ier li terature m ore transparent, we make the following two parametric specifications for the functional forms of the production technology and the disutility of employee effort.
Assumption R:
The technology is assumed to satisfy the concave production function
Assumption G: The increasing and convex disutility of effort belongs to the class of isoelastic functions
Under assumptions R and G the equilibrium condition (4) with respect to the employment decision can be written as follows 1 * ) 6 (
where θ denotes the expected value of revenue shock and 1 ) 1
is the direct wage elasticity of labour demand. Labour demand depends negatively on the base wage and positively on the effort of employee.
Analogously, by substituting assumption G into (5) we find that the optimal effort is given by
Hence the optimal effort depends positively on the base wage as well as on profit sharing.
We can now summarize our characterization of the optimal combination of employment and effort provision in Equation (6) suggests that labour demand does not directly depend on profit sharing, which lies in conformity with empirical evidence (see e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990)) and Cahuc and Dormont (1997) ). Profit sharing enhances productivity by stimulating effort provision. We first analyse the timing structure (I) (see Figure 1) , where the firm is flexible by deciding on the profit share after the base wage negotiation. Hence at stage 2 the firm decides on the profit share in order to maximize the expected net profit subject to (6) and (7) and by taking the base wage as given according to
It is shown in Appendix A that the optimal profit share, when it will be decided after wage negotiation, is At stage 1 the base wage is negotiated. We apply the Nash bargaining solution, according to which employment and profit sharing are unilaterally determined by the firm, whereas effort is provided subject to the discretion of employees. In line with (3), the objective function of the trade union can be written as
where the first term captures the benefits from employment to employed workers, the where the subscript w denotes the partial derivatives with respect to the wage rate. We assume that the sufficient second-order condition for the Nash bargaining solution (13) holds. The determinants of the negotiated base wage 
denotes the total wage elasticity of labour demand, which incorporates both the direct negative employment effect and the indirect positive effect via effort provision. Hence profit sharing has two opposite effects on the negotiated base wage: (i) it tends to induce wage moderation as part of the compensation is shifted to the performance-related profit share and (ii) the effort-enhancing effects of profit sharing will also increase the costs of effort provision and thereby increase the " individual rationality" constraint of each union member, which will have a positive effect on the wage rate, ceteris paribus. By substituting the optimal effort (7) into (14) Our analysis associated with the Nash bargaining solution (15) simultaneously includes profit sharing and efficiency wage considerations. Altenburg and Straub (1999) , Bulkley and Myles (1996) , Lindbeck
IV.2. Base Wage and Profit Share Commitment
Next we analyse the timing structure (II) (see Figure 1) , where the firm commits to the profit share prior to the base wage negotiation. When the firm commits to the profit share, it means that equation (8) is maximized with respect to τ subject to labour demand (6), effort determination (7) and the Nash bargaining solution for the base wage. Using a similar procedure as in Appendix A, the optimal profit share is found to be
for the case when the firm commits itself to the profit share before the wage negotiation (see also Koskela and Stenbacka (2004) ).
Based on a straightforward comparison between (16) and (9) we can conclude that and Snower (1991) and Sanfey (1993) analyse related issues, but these models do not include profit sharing as an incentive device.
Intuitively, under commitment profit sharing has a wage-moderating effect. This effect adds to the returns from profit sharing. Thus, the optimal profit share under commitment exceeds that associated with flexibility.
IV.3. Base Wage and Profit Share Negotiation
Finally, we analyse the timing structure (III) (see Figure 1) , where the profit share and the base wage are determined simultaneously. We first study the negotiated profit share (scheme III(i)) and configuration where the firms decides on the profit share simultaneously with the base wage negotiation (scheme III(ii)).
With simultaneous negotiation the parties decide on w andτ in order to solve
subject to the labour demand (6) and the effort determination (7). This gives a negotiated base wage, which formally looks identical to (15) . In terms of profit sharing we have the following first-order condition
Solution of equation (18) Furthernore, for each 1 0 < < β presence of the efficiency effect raises the negotiated profit share (see (19) and (20)).
We can now summarize our analysis of the timing structure where the profit share is determined simultaneously with the base wage negotiation. 
V. Brief Conclusion
This study has offered a new unified framework for analyzing the determination of employment, the effort provided by employed union members, the wage, and profit sharing when firms face uncertainty generated by a stochastic revenue shock. Our analysis focused on the implications for the optimal profit share of the relative timing structure of profit sharing and wage bargaining.
Most importantly, we demonstrated that the optimal profit share under commitment exceeds that under flexibility. This holds true, because by committing to a profit share the firm can induce wage moderation. This wage-moderating effect promotes profit sharing as it adds to the returns from using the profit sharing instrument. Moreover, when the firm decides on profit sharing simultaneously with the wage bargaining, the optimal profit share is identical to the profit share under flexibility. Finally, if the profit share is determined through Nash bargaining, the profit share is higher in the presence of the productivity effect when the trade union has some bargaining power.
Appendix A: Derivation of the optimal profit share with flexibility
The first-order condition associated with the maximization of (8) with respect to τ and subject to (6) and (7) (for given w ) is (14) and (15) . . QED
